On Iran - Alon Pinkas in Haaretz:

‘An effective attack on Iran's deeply buried and heavily fortified nuclear research installations and uranium enrichment plants requires two fundamental capabilities: a sustained aerial strike capability; and an arsenal of heavy, high-payload, penetrative munitions. Israel has neither.’

(…)

‘Netanyahu has been fantasizing, and likely still is, about a U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. In his mind, that would turn the catastrophe and debacle of October 7 into a defining strategic triumph. Assuming that an American attack will not happen, he may be tempted to go it alone.
U.S. President Joe Biden, while justifying Israeli retaliation over Iran's launching of 181 ballistic missiles at Israel last week, called for a proportional response, urging Israel not to target nuclear infrastructure or Iran's oil installations. However, his willingness and appetite to apply levers of pressure to affect Israeli decisions is low.’

(…)

‘The Americans are warning Israel that an independent attack with the inevitable limited and only partial success would expedite Iran's decision and provide the impetus to rush to a bomb as a protective survival shield for the regime in Tehran. The United States has said, and reiterated since the 1990s, that it will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear bomb. Such a development, therefore, would be very challenging for the Americans, who have zero interest in a war with Iran.’

(…)

‘The bravado and gung-ho cries in Israel – heard across the political spectrum like a chorus of Japanese banzai chants – is not only limited to Iran's nuclear facilities but also its oil industry.
Striking Iran's oil infrastructure and terminals is as strategic as targeting its nuclear program. Iran's oil requires some background data and perspective, because both the advocates of such an attack and those opposing it tend to be hyperbolic.
Iran produces some 4 million barrels of oil a day and currently exports approximately 2 million barrels daily, circumventing U.S. and Western sanctions through a "dark fleet" of tankers destined primarily for China. The world produces around 97 million barrels of crude oil a day and consumes 100 million barrels. As a result, Iran's contribution to the world market is around 2 percent. (The vast natural gas field in the Persian Gulf that Iran and Qatar share – the largest in the world – is extremely underdeveloped on the Iranian side, but holds tremendous potential.)’

(…)

‘So, anyone hysterically arguing that an attack on Iran's oil infrastructure would raise prices at the gas station in Atlanta or Phoenix is missing the point. The price of a barrel of oil will rise because of uncertainty and unpredictability, not because Iran's 2 million barrels will be subtracted. The price of gasoline will not rise between an Israeli attack and the U.S. elections on November 5.’

(…)

‘Ninety percent of Iran's oil is exported to China, constituting 15 percent of Chinese imports. China will increase purchases from Russia and elsewhere, but Iran cannot sustain losing that market – which is why it may be impelled to escalate further.
There is a case to be made that an attack on Iran designed to downgrade the threat it poses and possibly result in a reconfiguration of the region's dynamics makes strategic sense.
There is an equally valid case to be made that Israel should strive for regional power balances and mutual deterrence, since decisive military successes are unattainable – especially because Israel hasn't bothered to align those ideas with feasible political goals.’

Read the article here.

In short, Israel cannot effectively attack Iran’s nuclear installations.

Israel might be able to attack Iran’s oil installations, but the question remains: why?

In other words, Israel’s counterattack will be highly symbolic, bit still potentially deadly.

Iran might be happy to remain on the threshold: ‘Iran is still hesitating – for political and possibly also for religious reasons – about producing a bomb and becoming a nuclear power for all intents and purposes. Iran is not a nuclear state because it hasn't yet firmly decided whether it's in its interest to become one.’ See here.

Israel and the US might push Iran to become a nuclear state, whereas officially the US will do everything in its power to prevent Iran from obtaining the bomb.

The ironies of geopolitics, the unexpected side effects of Reapolitik.