Emma Ashford in Foreign Affairs:

‘As the negotiation phase of the Ukraine war begins in the coming days, it is important to understand that security guarantees are not the only way to prevent Russian recidivism. Instead, policymakers should consider alternatives to direct security guarantees: how to boost Ukraine’s own deterrent capabilities while addressing the conflict’s underlying causes. Ultimately, such steps are likely to be more credible and more effective than a half-baked European peacekeeping force overly reliant on the United States for crucial support in areas such as surveillance and military logistics.’

(…)

‘With NATO off the table, and the United States refusing to send troops, discussion in European policy circles has focused on ways to provide a security guarantee for Ukraine that replicates but does not require NATO membership. Some agreements are already in place: states including France, Poland, and the United Kingdom have signed bilateral security cooperation agreements with Ukraine, mostly related to weapons or training. Commitments to provide troops, however, have been less forthcoming. Private discussions on troop deployments to enforce a line of demarcation are ongoing. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said that his country could send troops, but French President Emmanuel Macron—the only European leader to previously pledge such deployments—has become equivocal on this question, backing off his original commitment. Poland, perhaps the most vocal supporter of Ukraine, has flatly denied plans to send troops to Ukraine.’

(…)

‘Another problem for Washington is that these European efforts do not necessarily keep the United States out of future conflict. For one thing, most experts writing about the potential deployment of European troops in Ukraine usually include a caveat: the backing of U.S. enablers (in the form of assistance on command and control, aerial refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) would be necessary to make the deployment possible. This need reflects the reality that European states are not fully capable of mounting an operation of this size without U.S. support, meaning that U.S. troops would have to be present, at least in small numbers, to support European deployments.’

(…)

‘A rebuilt and adequately supplied Ukrainian military would be a formidable deterrent to Moscow, and Western support will be critical to this military rebuilding. Rather than paper promises of NATO membership—or insufficient European troop deployments—what Ukraine needs is Western partners to provide arms and funding in the case of a future war, much as these states have done for the last three years.’

(…)

‘Perhaps this is why the administration is so keen on stating realities that are widely understood in Washington and Moscow but rarely expressed. These aren’t concessions but rather make clear that the Western negotiating standpoint must begin from a place of clear-eyed pragmatism.’

Read the article here.

Clear-eyed pragmatism? That’s an original wat to describe Trump’s foreign policy.

Okay, let’s do it.

Europe is militarily totally dependent on the US and the US lost interest in its stepson.

If Ukrainians are willing to die for Ukraine they may do so. The West is willing to sell arms. Since 2022 approximately 750,000 Ukrainians have died.

No, this is no Munich 1938. Putin is not Hitlet, the US is not the UK.

The US wants to get more buck for their protection.

The consequences? let’s make a bet. When will Germany have nuclear arms?

In twenty years from now.

The Germans are romantics and nuclear arms can be very romantic.