On deterrence – The Economist:
‘Yet extended deterrence is a strange and unnatural thing. One country must promise to use its nuclear forces—and thereby risk nuclear annihilation—on behalf of another. The difficulty of making that promise credible is what drove America to build a huge arsenal and to scatter it across the world. Britain’s nuclear forces, though modest, are also “assigned” to the defence of nato. Though only the prime minister can authorise their use, the implicit promise is that they would be used to defend allies such as Finland, Romania or Turkey.’
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‘In its Poker exercise, the French air force practises long-range nuclear bombing raids four times a year. In 2020, after the shock of Mr Trump’s first term, Mr Macron invited allies to “associate” with French nuclear drills. Voilà, in 2022 an Italian tanker refuelled French aircraft in one such exercise. In recent days, other allies have offered to take part, says a person familiar with those talks.
The question is how much further this might go. French nuclear-capable aircraft increasingly take part in conventional exercises abroad, including with Lithuania and Germany last year. In 2018 Mr Tertrais suggested that France could eventually rotate unarmed nuclear-capable Rafale fighter bombers to eastern European air bases “to demonstrate its solidarity”. That would not be just a political signal. It would also extend the range at which France could strike Russia and safely return its aircraft. In more extreme scenarios, Mr Tertrais writes, France could base tens of air-launched missiles in Germany, allow these to be carried by allied jets or even convene “a European nuclear maritime task-force”.
The problem with all this is scale. America’s arsenal is large enough, notes Mr Watkins, “that it is plausible that it could employ some weapons in response to [an] attack on an ally while still having plenty in reserve…to deter an attack on the us homeland.” In Britain’s case, he adds, using a single missile at lower levels of escalation—say, in response to Russia’s use of a tactical nuclear weapon—“could compromise the location of the sole deployed submarine”. These problems are hardly insurmountable. Britain raised its cap on warheads in 2021 and could do so again. Moreover, if it built five rather than four Dreadnought-class submarines, the first of which is expected in the early 2030s, it could put two boats out to sea at once.’
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‘Even so, Mr Trump has sparked Europe’s most profound nuclear debate since the 1950s.’
Read the article here.
Mr. Trump sparked many things, and once again, he has done more for Europe’s unity than the EU managed to do in the last decades.
In order to have unity, you need a reliable enemy. Putin was not reliable enough.
As an acquaintance of me put it a few days ago: I suddenly felt proud to be European.
All I can say is: thank you Mr. Trump.